Introduction
Birch demonstrated that new and young firms create more jobs than mature firms (Birch, 1981) . This concept has subsequently been supported by several scholars (e.g., Davis et al. (1997) and Dahl et al. (2009) ). 1 Therefore, during the current global economic crisis, many have pointed to entrepreneurs as being part of the solution. In particular, young high-growth firms -or gazelles -have received significant attention in this context.
Over the past two decades, a growing area of literature focusing on high-growth firms has emerged. Scholars have focused on the disproportionate economic contributions that these firms have made through innovations and job creation (Parker et al., 2010) . The evidence of their economic significance has sparked increasing interest among policy makers and researchers, who ask how the number of these gazelles can be increased (Halabisky et al., 2006; Stangler, 2010; OECD, 2010; Lopez-Garcia and Puente, 2011) .
Initial high growth rates signal that a new entrant is productive and competitive relative to both its peers and incumbent firms in the market. Moreover, employment growth is argued to increase survival chances, especially when growth occurs early in a firm's life (Phillips and Kirchhoff, 1989; Almus, 2004) . Consequently, high-growth entrants are expected to survive longer and perform better than the average start-up. Conversely, although the positive short-term effects on economic growth and job creation originating from gazelles are indisputable, the long-term economic gains resulting from these highgrowth start-ups are less obvious. The above-stated long-term performance prediction for high-growth start-ups is not evident. Our empirical findings suggest that although they begin with a flying start, high-growth start-ups are often eventually outperformed by slower growing entrants. We find that an initial period of rapid employment growth eventually reduces survival chances and leads to lower employment growth and higher employee turnover. Thus, an active industrial policy that works to ensure the best conditions for high-growth start-ups and the possible promotion of potential gazelles over other entrants does not guarantee the creation of sustainable firms (Stangler, 2010) .
Despite the significant interest in this topic, we have limited knowledge on the longterm performance of high-growth start-ups. Because of gazelles' initial disproportionate contributions towards job creation, which signals a high-quality business idea and concept, above-average production efficiency, and favorable market conditions, it is assumed that gazelles can contribute more than other entrants to sustainable employment and economic growth. In opposition to this assumption, we argue that although high-growth start-ups outperform other entrants in the short-term, their rapid employment expansion causes ini-1 See Henrekson and Johansson (2008) for a review of this area of the literature.
tial instability, which leads to long-term disadvantages, as their organizational setup tends to be less efficient. This suggestion implies a trade-off between firms' initial employment growth and their long-term performance.
Within this paper, we offer an organizational theory perspective for explaining this counterintuitive trade-off between early and long-term performance. One argument for the negative effects of initial growth on long-term performance rests on the liability of newness hypothesis (Stinchcombe, 1965) . Although high-growth firms do not necessarily lack the access to critical resources that other new entrants suffer, they are identical to their slower growing competitors in their deficiency of a stable organizational structure, processes, routines, and clear distribution of roles. Without exception, newly founded ventures must first establish this initial organizational setup, which includes employees' obtainment of applied experience among the employees within the specific organizational context, the development of strong social trust relationships, and the realization of the organizational vision, or blueprint, as phrased by organizational ecologists (Carroll, 1983; Freeman et al., 1983; Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Carroll and Hannan, 2000; Hannan et al., 2007) . We argue that this process takes time and requires stability among the organizational members to ensure the emergence of an efficient structure. We argue that high employment growth rates prolong the process of establishing initial organizational efficiency in terms of routines or a blueprint. When this process is prolonged, the organization expands faster than its members can gain experience with each other and the firm, and thus the organization cannot manage to efficiently integrate new members (Penrose, 1995; Garnsey et al., 2006) .
We thus argue that although high-growth start-ups outperform other entrants in the short run, early rapid employment expansion causes organizational instability that leads to longterm disadvantages and lower performance because their organizational setup tends to be less efficient.
To our knowledge, no previous studies have empirically tested the above propositions.
This lack of evidence might exist because of a lack of applicable data, as such an analysis places extensive demands on the data source. We use a unique and comprehensive Danish panel dataset that provides annual observations of all new firms in terms of such aspects as employment, firm formation, and exits. In accordance with the above line of reasoning, we focus our analysis on how initial growth rates might facilitate the explanation of performance differences among surviving firms. In other words, we investigate gazelles' long-term performance and compare them with their surviving counterparts that experienced lower growth rates during their early years. In support of our hypothesis, we find evidence that high-growth start-ups are often eventually outperformed by more slowly growing entrants.
We find that initial high growth and concurrent high employee turnover have persistent negative effects on firms' long-term performance. Higher initial growth reduces survival chances and leads to lower employment growth and higher employee turnover in the long run. Although these negative effects on firm performance decrease over time, we find that they persist even beyond the tenth year. We also demonstrate that higher turnover among high-growth entrants partially accounts for these negative effects. We conclude that attaining a larger size via continuous moderate growth or higher growth at a later stage is superior to attaining this size quickly through early, rapid employment growth.
The paper proceeds as follows. First, we briefly present the phenomenon being studied:
gazelles and their unexpected poor long-term performance as compared with their slower growing competitors. Subsequently, we develop our hypotheses and explain why initial rapid employment growth has persistent negative effects on firms' long-term performance.
Moreover, we elaborate on the argument that hasty expansion is likely to result in higher turnover rates in both the long and short run, which further fosters the organizational instability that may threaten a firm's long-term performance. Next, we present the data and elaborate on the methodology. After presenting our results and a discussion of these results, we conclude.
The phenomenon
Because of their disproportionate economic contributions, high-growth start-ups have received significant attention from both researchers and politicians. Intuitively, growth signals efficient production, and we might expect that early employment growth reflects new firms' competitiveness. Although gazelles' positive short-term effects on economic growth and job creation are indisputable, the long-term economic gains acquired by these high-growth start-ups are less obvious. In opposition to the previously mentioned popular belief regarding high-growth entrants' sustainable economic contributions, we argue that initial organizational instability, caused by these firms' rapid employment expansion, has persistent and negative consequences for these firms' long-term performance, including lower survival chances. To provide an empirical reference point for the paper's conceptual contributions, this section illustrates the counterintuitive empirical phenomenon, i.e., the negative trade-off between initial high employment growth and firms' long-term performance. Before proceeding with this empirical evidence, we discuss and clarify the relevant definitions.
The literature generally refers to high-growth firms as firms with relatively high growth rates regardless of age, whereas a gazelle company usually implies a younger firm. However, previous studies differ in terms of both their definition of "high growth", and which companies they consider "young". For example, OECD (2008) defines high-growth enter-4 prises as firms with an average annual growth (in terms of either employment or sales) of 20 % or more over a three-year period. Moreover, OECD restricts the definition to companies with ten employees or more in the first year. Gazelles are defined as a subset of this population, so firms older than five years are excluded (OECD, 2008) . Similar definitions are found in other studies of young high-growth firms, but they vary in terms of observation period, firm age, and performance measure (e.g., Halabisky et al. (2006) , Acs and Mueller (2008) and Stangler (2010) ). In this paper, we define gazelles in relative terms.
We examine the long-term effects of initial employment growth over the entire spectrum of growth rates instead of focusing on a subpopulation of extraordinarily high-growth firms. Figure 1 : Kaplan-Meier survival estimates for three categories of ln(employment growth) 0−2 , adjusting for ln(employees) t and ln(employees) 0 . The first thirdtile exhibits low or negative growth, the second thirdtile exhibits moderate growth, and the third thirdtile exhibits high growth.
When comparing the long-term performance of gazelles with that of their less rapidly expanding counterparts, an initial requirement for all firms is survival. Although new entrants that exit during the initial years of existence might also have lasting effects on the economy, for example, through innovation spill-overs, we argue that persistent positive economic effects and sustainable job creation are primarily realized by surviving firms.
Therefore, we follow Acs and Mueller's (2008) example, defining gazelles as high-growth firms that are five years of age or younger. Consequently, we analyze their long-term 5 performance from the sixth year onwards, and we exclude firms that exit prior to this point in time. Figure 1 shows Kaplan-Meier survival estimates for young firms from age 5 to 13. These firms are divided into three groups according to their initial employment growth. 2 We define initial growth as total employment growth during the two years following start-up.
We elaborate on this definition below. Figure 1 shows that firms with lower employment growth during the initial years (first thirdtile), have the highest likelihood of survival, whereas firms within the third thirdtile (highest initial growth rates) have the lowest survival rates. 3 The aim of this paper is to explain this apparent counterintuitive tradeoff between initial growth and long-term performance.
Theoretical background and hypotheses
Growth rates serve as a major firm performance indicator that is generally interpreted as a sign of a firm's efficient production, thus its competitiveness. Early rapid employment growth could signify favorable market conditions, low competitive pressure, and a firstmover advantage. Firms might utilize high employment growth rates to realize economies of scale, and growth can thus conduce further growth (Garnsey et al., 2006) . Moreover, firms benefit from newly hired employees, as they contribute new knowledge, networks, and new perspectives and ideas to the company, thereby strengthening and renewing the firms' competences (McKendrick et al., 2009; Eriksen, 2011) . This resource inflow further enhances a company's resource base so that it can identify and realize additional growth opportunities (Penrose, 1995; Garnsey et al., 2006) . Despite these positive attributes of growth, some scholars have emphasized the inability of especially young and small firms to sustain high growth rates. A firm requires more resources when growing. Although employment growth increases a firm's resource base, a delay exists in the planning and efficient integration of these acquired resources, which limits the firm's growth opportunities (Penrose, 1995; Garnsey et al., 2006) . Coad (2007) provides another interesting study on firm growth patterns. In this study, which addresses serial growth correlation, Coad (2007) finds that while larger firms are typically subject to positive autocorrelation, small firms are unlikely to experience above average performance for two consecutive years.
This negative correlation in growth rates is especially significant for small high-growth firms. As firm size and age are often correlated, one might expect similar results for young 2 Dividing firms into four groups gives a similar result. However, many firms' initial growth rates equal the 25th or the 75th percentile intersection points, thus resulting in an uneven distribution of firms among the quartiles. For this reason, we use thirdtiles instead.
3 Not adjusting for ln(employees)0 in Figure 1 does not alter this picture.
6 high-growth firms.
In the following sections, we develop two arguments for why initial rapid employment expansion might negatively affect a firm's long-term performance. First, we argue that an organization requires time to establish efficient structures and routines. Employees also need time to gain experience with each other and with the firm. We argue that these aspects are particularly important within the first years of a venture's lifetime. These factors limit the growth rate at which an organization can efficiently expand. Growth rates beyond this point are harmful to an organization because high growth postpones the point at which an organization can finally develop persistent, efficient routines based on the continuous presence of experienced organizational members. High initial employment growth may disrupt this process and prolong the liability of newness. Second, we argue that the organizational blueprint that corresponds with the challenges of high-growth startups eventually becomes ill-suited to the organization. The subsequent inevitable change of the organizational form's core features may place the organization in a life-threatening situation. Both arguments affirm that overly rapid employment growth has a negative effect on long-term firm performance.
Becoming an efficient organization
Within the disciplines of economics, as well as business, an extensive area of literature has emerged on performance and survival among new and young firms. Most studies in this area concentrate on explaining the frequently observed low survival rates of new and young firms. The baseline argument is summarized in the "liability of newness" or, as firm age and size tend to correlate, the "liability of smallness" hypotheses (Aldrich and Auster, 1986; Brüderl and Schüssler, 1990; Audretsch and Mahmood, 1994) . First, new and young firms lack legitimacy and networks, which might limit their access to customers and resources, for example, capital and employees. Similarly, it might also be more difficult for smaller firms to attract resources. In addition, smaller firms have higher unit production costs, as they cannot utilize economies of scale (Stinchcombe, 1965; Freeman et al., 1983; Brüderl and Schüssler, 1990; Brüderl et al., 1992; Hager et al., 2004) . However, these points do not particularly apply to young high-growth firms. On the contrary, one might argue that initial high growth signifies efficient production, indicating that the new firm is competitive in comparison with its peers, as well as incumbent firms within the same market. This signal of superior efficiency might increase legitimacy and render the attraction of resources, especially talented employees, easier for these firms.
However, even these high-growth firms are subject to a second aspect of the liability of newness, as they also lack efficient procedures and organizational routines.
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An organization's ability to coordinate its skills effectively lies in the quality of its routines. Routines are thus essential to the efficient exploitation and integration of knowledge.
Routines are the repeated interactions within a firm, and routines evolve from practical experience, including the development of social trust relationships (Nelson and Winter, 1982) . Therefore, it takes time to develop these efficient organizational activity patterns.
Building strong social relationships characterized by trust among the employees and among the employees and the management also takes time (Stinchcombe, 1965) . However, within young high-growth firms, these processes are repeatedly disrupted and, hence, efficient developments are prevented. High employee turnover and expanding business render the distribution of roles unclear, as employees and the job functions continuously change, and the development and implementation of stable and efficient organizational routines becomes infeasible. Moreover, the organizational structure, including the explicit line of authority, the implicit hierarchy, and the distribution of roles might be unclear, thus further hampering the development of efficient organizational routines.
An efficient allocation of tasks and resources and the development of efficient organizational routines also include organizational members' acquisition of experience with each other and with the firm. Penrose (1995) (Penrose, 1995, p. 47) .
Because of the necessity of the individual obtainment of experience with one another and the firm to establish an efficient structure, there is a limit to firm growth, beyond which, a firm becomes inefficient (Penrose, 1995) . Only by gaining these types of experience and obtaining knowledge of and establishing confidence in each other are employees able to provide valuable services to the firm according to its unique vision and setting not only individually but also as cogwheels within the organization as a whole. Although, a clear picture, plan or blueprint of a sizable organization might exist, it is simply impossible to continue "to hire people to fill the various positions and carry out functions laid down in detailed job descriptions" (Penrose (1995), p. 46) . Newly hired individuals require not only instruction but also time to obtain the required experience in various 8 dimensions to become an efficient part of the organization. Consequently, only moderate growth rates allow for this experience to be obtained, thus for the development of stable, efficient procedures.
The organizational blueprint: not built to last Although the above requirements for an efficient organizational behavior are valid throughout a venture's lifetime, we argue that they are especially crucial directly after a firm's foundation. During this very early stage, the organization must establish the very first set of processes and procedures so that the original blueprint and business vision can be realized. The organization must establish its fundamentals of interaction on which grounds the future organization will evolve.
The organizational blueprint is imprinted at birth and during the initial years, and organizations will retain their founding structures for long periods of time (Stinchcombe, 1965) . We utilize the definition of the organizational blueprint or simply, the organizational form, as proposed by Hannan and Freeman (1977) : "an organizational form is a blueprint for organizational action, for transforming inputs into outputs" (Hannan and Freeman, 1977, p. 935) . This definition includes i) the formal structure of the organization, ii) the patterns of activity within the organization, and iii) normative order (Hannan and Freeman, 1977) . According to the imprinting hypothesis, it is the environment (external and internal circumstances at the time of founding) that shapes -or imprints -a firm's unique organizational characteristics (Delacroix and Carroll, 1983; Phillips, 2005; Beckman and Burton, 2008) . This hypothesis suggests not only that origin matters but also that imprinting has long-term or even lifelong effects on the organization. Thus, when an organization achieves high growth during its initial years, it will establish an organizational form suited to that specific context. However, we argue that this strategy might not be suitable in a more stable environment where growth rates eventually slow. For example, if the organizational form that was appropriate during the initial high-growth phase becomes ill-suited at some point because of external threats, such as increased competition or a decrease in demand, the organization might find it very difficult to change and adapt to the new conditions, even to a point at which change will become a perilous exercise. This transition is especially perilous if core features that are embedded in the organizational blueprint are subject to change (Baron and Hannan, 2002; Hannan et al., 2006) . With reference to the industry life cycle literature (Klepper, 1996; Agarwal et al., 2002) , we thus propose that although the initial organizational form might be the optimal choice during the entrepreneurial phase, industries eventually stabilize, thus rendering this organizational form unsuitable, independent of the managerial professionalism upon which it was originally built.
In sum, although exceedingly fast growth during the very early years of a venture's lifetime follows a clear expansion plan, it might ultimately harm the organization. This harm may either result from an inefficiency that decreases the initial comparative advantage, as argued in the Penrosean framework, a delay in the emergence of solid and efficient organizational routines, or the alteration of an organizational form that ultimately proves to be incompatible. It follows that, independent of which organization theory lens we apply, all frameworks univocally suggest that extraordinarily high growth during the initial life cycle stage of an organization has negative effects on performance, though because of varying reasons. Therefore, we hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 1: High initial employment growth has persistent negative effects on firms'
long-term performance
High growth, employee turnover and long-term performance
The following sections are built on the premise that an initial period of rapid employment growth has persistent negative effects on firms' long-term performance (Hypothesis 1). To explain and investigate this counterintuitive trade-off in more detail, we rely on a more explorative approach than above because, as previously noted, previous research on this particular topic is limited. Although we also acknowledge the existence of potential supplementary explanations, we choose to focus on the employees and, in particular, employee turnover, as the key mechanism to further explain why excessively high initial employment growth rates result in poorer long-term performance. Previous studies have shown that employee turnover has negative effects on a firm's productivity and financial performance (revenue and return over assets) (Baron et al., 2001; Eriksen, 2011; Eriksen, 2012) . These results suggest that high initial growth can be harmful to the organization's long-term performance because high employment growth is often associated with higher rates of employee turnover (Baron et al., 2001) . In this section, we propose that there is a correlation between initial high growth and employee turnover. We argue that initial growth increases early employee turnover rates and that it also has persistent effects on firms' long-term employee turnover ratios. We also suggest that initial high turnover ratios might make an imprint on the organization and lead to consistent higher employee turnover in the future. If high employee turnover has disruptive effects on mature firms, as well as on young firms, this proposition can facilitate the illumination of the mechanisms behind initial high growth's negative effect on firms' long-term performance. We return to this discussion of the employee turnover's negative effects in the next section.
Long-term employee turnover as a consequence of high initial growth
In this section, we will argue that both the type of employees typically employed by rapidly growing start-ups, as well as the dominant employment model within these firms, are likely to entail (additional) challenges to the organization's achievement of high long-term performance by increasing long-term employee turnover ratios. First, in the very early days, gazelles clearly benefit from their premium access to talented employees by offering an innovative and vivid growth environment, which allows their employees to address, for example, technical challenges, without contending with a confining bureaucratic apparatus (Baron et al., 2001 ). However, as we argue above, the development of a solid set of procedures and routines is necessary for ensuring an efficient course of action and enhancing survival chances. The eventual implementation of hierarchies, thus bureaucracy, is inevitable. Consequently, as the former gazelle company ages and becomes increasingly bureaucratic and routinized, its highly valuable technical labor force, with its "renowned antipathy to rigid bureaucracy" (Baron et al. (2001) , p. 976), is very likely to leave the organization to strive for higher financial rewards and challenges in new ventures. In addition, Baron et al. (2001) point to other arguments for why high-growth start-ups are likely to experience higher turnover rates than their competitors. First, high growth often stresses organizational members, potentially because of the lack of stability. Second, as these high-growth start-ups are forced to expand the level of employment, quick or even hasty hiring decisions are likely to result in mistakes. In turn, this lack of stability and poor hiring decisions lead to premature employment contract terminations. Finally, gazelles are often active in flourishing and growing industries. Therefore, the labor market in their environment tends to be highly competitive, and valuable employees might simply be headhunted by competitors.
Second, although the organization cannot control some of these factors, to a certain extent, it can control the applied employment model. As we argue above, founders choose an organizational form, i.e., a coordination mechanism, including an employment model, that fits the internal and external environment during the early phases of the organization.
As newly founded ventures do not have an established bureaucratic apparatus, they tend to rely on coordination mechanisms based on peer group control, attachment via challenging tasks, and emotional commitment to the organization's vision, and these organizations often allow their members to have a certain degree of autonomy. Alternatively, the employment model can be based on a rather formal pure money-for-work exchange relationship, in which employees are selected based on their skills rather than on their potential or fit within the organizational culture (Baron et al., 2001; Baron and Hannan, 2002) . All of these employment models could be applicable and structure and guide the expansion of a newly founded high-growth firm. Thus, we do not argue that high-growth firms run a greater risk of choosing the wrong employment model per se. However, the crucial point is that, ultimately, even the optimal choice of any of these employment models might not be optimal. External factors, such as the product or industry life cycle, change over time and enter new stages, and firms' growth rates eventually decrease. Therefore, changing the original employment model, which was designed to optimize the rapid expansion of the high-growth firm's business, becomes inevitable. Although some employment models are more difficult to change than others, merely having to change the employment model, and thus, one of the core features of the organizational blueprint, challenges the organization's coherence and threatens the organization's survival. The unavoidable increase in turnover associated with altering the deeply rooted organizational blueprint constitutes one of the most severe consequences in this respect.
In accordance with the organizational ecology line of reasoning, which suggests an internal resistance to core organizational changes (Hannan et al., 2007) , we argue that increased turnover can be expected among not only employees with a long tenure in the organization but also, perhaps less obviously, among newly hired personnel. First, Baron et al. (2001) find evidence that employees with higher tenure are more likely to leave when an organization alters its employment model. In addition, they propose that changing the organization's employment model might also lead to early contract terminations among newly hired employees. Although the original organizational model might be known by the outside labor force, thus attracting a certain type of employees, the new model lacks awareness and legitimacy with regard to the external environment, which increases the risk of a mismatch between newly hired employees and the new organizational form (Baron et al., 2001 ).
In sum, we argue that the type of employee in gazelle companies and the potential mistakes resulting from hastily made hiring decisions, will ultimately lead to higher employee turnover. We also suggest that, although optimal in the short run, these gazelles' initial employment models must eventually be altered as growth rates slow. We expect this potentially disruptive and destabilizing change in the organization's core features to increase long-term turnover rates. Therefore, we hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 2a: Higher initial employment growth ultimately increases employee turnover Hypothesis 2b: Higher initial employee turnover ultimately increases employee turnover

Employee turnover's negative performance effect
The positive correlation between initial employment growth and employee turnover, which we suggested in the previous section, can be an important factor in explaining the negative trade-off between initial and long-term performance if employee turnover impedes firm performance. The most obvious reason why employee turnover is expected to negatively affect firm performance is employee outflow, as it implies the loss of human capital.
More precisely, the company risks losing crucial knowledge, including not only technical knowledge but also idiosyncratic and tacit knowledge of the organization and its interaction style (Eriksen, 2011) . Consequently, the organization suffers from this employee outflow, as it loses valuable resources that originally determined its success. This loss of skills might cause a decline in productivity. Eriksen (2011) further adds that the normally steeper learning curve that exists during the early years might suggest that the initial employees' accumulation of firm-specific human capital is especially important.
When employees leave a firm, it needs to fill the resulting gaps. Therefore, the costs of employee turnover also include recruiting and training expenses (Eriksen, 2012) . These expenses do not include only new rounds of recruiting. More importantly, these new members must be instructed, trained and integrated into the organization so that they can efficiently contribute to firm performance. However, of course, turnover is not a one-way street. Some employee turnover might actually be beneficial if companies use it to eliminate poor performers. Moreover, employee inflow increases the company's competences and refreshes its knowledge base, especially in terms of innovation purposes (McKendrick et al., 2009; Eriksen, 2011) . Although this effect certainly holds for mature firms, we claim that, during organizations' early days, the harm of high inflow rates, and thus high turnover, is potentially equal to the aforementioned intuitively perceivable negative effects of employee outflow. Obviously, young high-growth firms experience a predominantly high inflow of new employees to achieve their growth. However, in accordance with Penrose's (1995) initial quote, high inflow clearly counteracts the necessity of employee obtainment of sufficient experience with one another and with the firm. In an organization with continuous high employee turnover that exists primarily because of the frequent addition of new members, the potential to establish an efficient system is clearly hindered. If the system is meant to be efficient and able to create value beyond the sum of its individual parts, merely fine-tuning of the employees' repeated interactions is required. As we have previously argued, this process takes time. However, this process is disrupted or even restarted when too many new members are added to the organization. One major difficulty of this process is that an efficient system requires a stable, shared understanding of the organizational form, routines and norms. If the ratio of new to old employees be-comes too large because of the continuous inflow of new members, it becomes increasingly difficult for the old members to pass on organizational norms, for example, to the new employees. However, this knowledge sharing is necessary for the efficient integration of the new members.
Furthermore, the organization remains in a rather fluid state when it experiences a high inflow of new members, and employees will dedicate less effort to acquiring organizationspecific skills in this instable environment (Hannan and Freeman, 1984) . If employees hesitate to invest and engage themselves fully in a transient organizational form, despite a firm's great potential, inefficient production might result. We could even argue that remaining in this fluid state without stable routines and structures constitutes nothing else but a prolongation of the liability of newness. All in all, excessively high growth leads to an inefficient integration of new employees, and thus, the inability to perform competitively in the market, thus the firm might stagnate or lose its competitive advantage altogether (Penrose, 1995) .
Building on the above arguments, we suggest that high initial employee turnover has a persistent negative effect on firms' long-term performance. We emphasize that in the context of young high-growth firms, this effect is not predominantly driven by employee outflow and the subsequent loss of human capital. Instead, we claim that the high initial inflow of new employees represents the major obstacle to gazelles' establishment of a stable and efficient system, which, in turn, negatively affects their long-term performance.
Therefore, we hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 3a: Higher initial employee turnover has a persistent negative effect on firms' long-term performance Hypothesis 3b: Higher initial inflow of new employees has a persistent negative effect on firms' long-term performance
Furthermore, we argue that if the presence of experienced old members to pass on shared understanding, routines and norms constitutes one of the crucial transmission channels for the efficient integration of new members, it follows that increasing employee tenure during the early years should have a positive effect on firms' long-term performance. In particular, higher tenure renders the establishment of (efficient) routines easier, given the possibility of stable repeated interactions. Moreoever, higher tenure increases the capacity to integrate new employees. Therefore, we hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 3c: Higher initial employee tenure has a persistent positive effect on firms' long-term performance
These hypotheses and the preceding argumentation contribute to the previous line of arguments that despite the potential benefits of high employment growth, such as economies of scale and the inflow of new knowledge, networks, perspectives and ideas (Garnsey et al., 2006; McKendrick et al., 2009) , initial high employment growth and concurrent high employee turnover have negative effects on firms' long-term performance.
Data and method Data
We investigate the effects of initial high growth using the comprehensive Danish panel Similarly, firm exit is defined as two successive years of no activity (zero employees).
A general critique of empirical analysis built on national firm panel datasets such as the IDA is the inability to control for mergers and acquisitions, which are instead coded as exits. This issue is perhaps of even greater concern when investigating high-growth firms.
Therefore, we apply a conservative strategy of censoring firm exits if a firm's largest plant (at the time of exit) is still active the following year under a different owner code (a different company).
We hypothesize that an organization's ability to establish initial organizational structures has long-term consequences for firm performance. 
Estimations
In our analysis, we investigate how initial employment growth affects newly founded firms' long-term performance. Our analysis consists of three steps. First, we investigate how initial growth affects a firm's long-term chances of survival. Organizational mortality is the favored measure of organizational performance when investigating the effects of organizational change using an organizational ecology model framework. Firm survival is the ultimate performance variable and is comparable across firms, industries, and contexts (Barnett and Carroll, 1995) . Second, we estimate the effects of initial growth on long-term employment growth. Garnsey et al. (2006) , who discuss the attributes of diverse growth measures, point to employment growth as the best growth measure because of its provision of standardized and comparable data on firm expansions. Employment growth is also the standard indicator in studies on firm growth patterns. Other obvious performance variables, such as profit and sales, suffer from more limitations than employment growth.
For example, firm profit constitutes a manner of increasing firm valuation or avoiding tax liabilities (Garnsey et al., 2006) . Finally, we investigate the ultimate effects of initial growth and initial employee turnover on employee turnover. In all analyses, long-term performance is defined by a firm's performance after the fifth year, as outlined in the previous section.
For the first part of our analysis, we utilize exponential regressions in accelerated failure-time form (AFT) 5 :
this estimation predicts time to failure, assuming that the baseline hazard, τ i , follows an exponential distribution with mean e β 0 (Cleves et al., 2004) .
For the second and third parts of our analysis, we follow Baron et al. (2001) and use generalized estimation equation (GEE) panel regressions (Zenger et al., 1988) to estimate the models of employment growth and employee turnover. This method is appealing, as it accounts for within-group correlation. Unlike a firm fixed effects approach, this approach allows us to include our key explanatory variables of initial organizational characteristics and initial growth, although they do not vary over time (Baron et al., 2001 ). We treat within-firm correlation as autoregressive (AR1), and we report semi-robust standard errors using the Huber/White/Sandwich estimator of variance. This method requires a minimum of two observations per firm and thus excludes firms that exit during the sixth year. To consider these firms when making the estimations, we further include the fifth year's observation by adding an additional observation for all firms in the sample, as we estimate the models of employment growth and employee turnover. To investigate the firms' longterm employment growth, we estimate the linear model:
where g i,t is the annual growth in the number of full-time equivalents from year t − 1 to t, relative to the average employment level within the two-year period of t − 1 to t (see equation 4). g i,t is provided in percentage form. Similarly, we estimate the model of the employee turnover rate for firm i at time t:
We measure the employee turnover rate at time t as the total inflow and outflow of employees during a given period, t−1 to t, relative to the average number of employees during this period (see equation 9). T urnover i,t is provided in percentage form and ranges from 0 to 200.
Key explanatory variables
We utilize four explanatory variables to test our hypotheses: employment growth, employee tenure, employee turnover rate, and employee inflow rate. We measure these variables for the first two years following start-up and estimate their effects on firm survival, employment growth and the employee turnover rate from the sixth year onwards.
we argue that the early years of an organization's life are crucial to its long-term performance. We define this period as the two years following start-up. First, in line with the liability of newness hypothesis, the literature on new firm survival demonstrates that the selection process is most distinct among new and younger firms, and this group of firms exhibits low survival rates. For example, Gjerløv-Juel and Dahl (2010) find that a third of Danish start-ups (with employees) do not survive the first two years. Similarly low survival rates are reported in other countries and for different industries (see, e.g., Audretsch (1991) ; Mata and Portugal (1994); Taylor (1999) ). Second, as we discussed above, the important and persistent effects of an organization's founding context and its initial choices, such as its initial strategy and employment model, are supported by the imprinting hypothesis. The imprinting literature most often refers to the founding context, which includes the external conditions and founder characteristics prevailing at the time of start-up. We extend this period to include the first two years after start-up, arguing that, for example, the organizational routines and norms for solidifying and realizing the firm's initial strategy evolve during this period. Only referring to the founding conditions would thus exclude the initial realization of the organizational blueprint, including the crucial phase of establishing the initial set of procedures and processes, which have longterm consequences for the organization's performance. In her study of start-ups in the mini computer industry, Romanelli (1989) finds that the majority of firms develop a stable market strategy within the first two years. This finding provides us with confidence that we chose a reasonable time frame for the initial growth spell, as establishing a stable market strategy goes hand in hand with creating the first set of processes, procedures and structures for realizing this aim. Although one might claim that a longer initial phase (of potentially up to five years) might constitute an equally reasonable choice, we argue that the initial two years is the best match for our theoretical framework. Moreover, we test the sensitivity of our results to this time period, expanding it to include the first three, four and five years. We note that, restricting the initial phase to simply two years does not have a decisive impact for our results.
In accordance with the above arguments, we suggest that the initial employment growth rate, the initial employee tenure, the initial employee turnover rate, and the initial inflow of new employees reflect a firm's initial growth pattern and initial organizational context. We elaborate on this suggestion below. First, Hypothesis 1 suggests that initial high growth has negative effects on a firm's long-term performance, as expanding business and high employee turnover postpone the formation of stable organizational structures and routines. To estimate this effect, we include the initial two-year employment growth rate in logged percentages. In accordance with Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) , we calculate the initial growth rate, g i,2 , as the difference between the number of full-time equivalents in the second year and the number of full-time equivalents at start-up, relative to the average number of employees during the two years. The latter partly accounts for the intuitive relation between size and growth, in which growth rates decline with firm size:
We estimate the effect of ln(g i,2 ), controlling for both start-up size and the number of employees at time t. As we argue above, we expect ln(g i,2 ) to have a negative effect on firm survival and employment growth.
Our second set of hypotheses (2a and 2b) develops the argument that higher initial employment growth and the accompanying higher initial employee turnover increase longterm employee turnover. We measure these effects using the initial growth rate, as well as initial employee turnover, during the first two years (equations 4 and 9, respectively).
The long-term effect is measured from year five onwards. We measure employee turnover at time t as the total inflow and outflow of employees during a given period, t − 1 to t, in proportion to the average number of employees during that period:
(e n,i,t = e n,i,t−1 ) (10)
(e n,i,t−1 = e n,i,t ) (11)
Employee inflow, E IN i,t , is the sum of employees in the firm at time t that were not employed in the firm the previous year, time t − 1. Similarly, employee outflow,
is the sum of employees employed at time t − 1 but not at time t.
The final set of hypotheses relies on the association between initial high employment growth and higher employee turnover. We argue that the accompanying initial high turnover has a negative effect on a firm's long-term performance (Hypothesis 3a). Moreover, we stated that this initial high turnover is predominantly a sign of the high initial inflow of new members. Therefore, in particular, the rapid initial inflow of new employees produces the effect on performance (Hypothesis 3b). To investigate Hypothesis 3a, we estimate the effect on firm performance from the average yearly turnover rate, T urnover i,t , from age 0 to 2, controlling for employee turnover at time t. Similarly, we test Hypothesis 3b by estimating the effect on firm performance from the average yearly inflow ratio from age 0 to 2 and controlling for the current inflow and outflow of employees.
In Hypothesis 3c, we argued that the negative effect of initial high employee turnover is driven by an excessively high ratio of new-to-old employees, which makes it difficult for old members to pass on, for example, organizational norms. We argue that this issue might prolong the liability of newness, implying a negative effect on long-term performance. To capture this effect, we include the average employee tenure (years) two years after start-up.
Controls
In addition to our key explanatory variables, we further include a number of controls when estimating firm performance. This section provides a description of these variables. The literature on new firm survival stresses that the founder or the founding team plays a significant role in the process of overcoming the liability of newness. The founder plays a key role in outlining the initial strategy by defining the organization's culture, implementing routines, and so on (see, e.g., Phillips (2005) ). As we argue above, the organizational blueprint is indisputably key to high firm performance and is not easily altered, rendering the founder's initial imprint on the organization highly significant for long-term performance. Previous studies point to several important founder characteristics. One argument for the high variance in new firm performance is the heterogeneity of founders' human capital. Founders have varying endowments of skills, knowledge and experiences, which influence their entrepreneurial abilities (e.g., the ability to identify opportunities), and it is argued that greater human capital improves production efficiency. The founder also makes initial strategic decisions based on his/her stock of human capital. Therefore, greater human capital might lead to better strategic decisions and the implementation of better organizational routines, thus increasing the firm's likelihood of survival and growth (Brüderl et al., 1992) . Entrepreneurs accumulate human capital primarily through education and work experience, the latter being of the greatest importance (Brüderl et al., 1992; Taylor, 1999) . Our study focuses on firms that have already survived the initial turbulent years, as we only include observations of firms after the fifth year. However, the effects on firm survival and growth because of founder characteristics are often found to persist even beyond these first difficult years. Therefore, we include controls for founders' work experience and education.
In the context of founders' work experience, three points must be highlighted. First, it is argued that entrepreneurs often build on organizational routines familiar to them, adapting the organizational features of their previous employer (Hannan and Freeman, 1986; Baron and Hannan, 2002; Phillips, 2005) . This argument indicates that the parent firm plays a role in shaping the new organization. Second, employment at a superior firm might increase the founder's social capital (better network relations) and human capital (through better access to knowledge). Whether better is equivalent to larger in this context is debatable. Although employment at larger (and more successful) firms increases human capital, it might also lead to skill specialization. Sørensen and Phillips (2011) and Dahl et al. (2009) suggest that work experience obtained in smaller parent firms is more valuable to founders. They argue that employees of smaller firms are less specialized than employees of larger firms, and thus, organizational structure and routines are more suitable for new and often small firms. Third, pre-founding experience has been highlighted as one of the key determinants of new firm survival. This effect is especially strong when the founder(s) has pre-founding experience in the same industry. That is, these start-ups are founded by former employees of incumbent firms in the same industry and are often referred to as spin-offs. Since Garvin (1983) , many studies have demonstrated that these spin-offs tend to outperform other new entrants (see, e.g., Klepper (2001) , Phillips (2002) and Agarwal et al. (2004) Given the above arguments and previous empirical findings, our controls for founder heterogeneity include the following: a spin-off dummy (employed at an incumbent firm in the same industry, same 4-digit SIC-code), founder age (years), an entrepreneurial experience dummy, a managerial experience dummy and founder education (years). The dummy variables refer to the last year's observation prior to start-up. If the company has more than one founder, we require that only one founder meet the dummy variable criteria.
Moreover, if a firm has more than one founder, the continuous variables refer to the mean values of the founding team. To control for the influence of parent firm performance, we include a dummy for parent firm size (50+ employees). In addition to the covariates described above, we control for firm heterogeneity in terms of the following: start-up size (full-time equivalents, logged), firm size (full-time equivalents, logged), founding team size (no. of founders), legal form (dummy for personal liability), and employee education (years). The employee turnover models also control for employee tenure (years). To control for industry-and region-specific factors, as well as various economic conditions, we include the following: market concentration (Herfindahl index, normalized), GDP growth (yearly real growth rate, pct.), firm age (8 dummies), industry (41 dummies), entry year (8 dummies), and labor market region (77 dummies). Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1 . experience, age, and education) increase the expected time until failure. When controlling for start-up size and firm size t , the model finds that employment growth during the first two years has a negative effect on survival time, which supports Hypothesis 1. We expect that the negative effect of initial growth diminishes over time. Therefore, we introduce the interaction term "Years after age 5 x ln(employment growth, age 0-2)" in Model 2, allowing the effect of initial employment growth to decrease over time. However, this variable is not significant in any of the survival models. This lack of significance suggests that the effect of initial growth on survival does not vary over time within our sample (age 5 to 12). This result provides strong support for Hypothesis 1, indicating that initial higher employment growth has persistent negative effects on firms' long-term performance. 197 4,197 4,197 4,197 4,197 4,197 The models only include observations of firms if age ≥ 5. All regressions include unreported controls for GDP growth, Age (7 dummies), Entry (7 dummies), Industry (40 dummies), and Region (76 dummies). Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: † : 10% * : 5% * * : 1%
Results
Firm survival
24
Testing this claim further, we also estimated Model 1, excluding firms younger than ten years of age (see Model 1, Table 5 ). The model finds that initial employment growth has a negative effect on the expected survival time even after the tenth year. Thus, within our sample, we can confirm the hypothesis that higher initial growth has a persistent negative effect on firm performance.
In Model 3, Table 2 , we further include the employee turnover ratio t . When controlling for employee turnover t , Model 3 reveals that initial growth has a negative effect on firm survival. A one percent increase in the initial growth rate (age 0 to 2) decreases the expected survival time by 3.05 %. 7 Furthermore, Model 3 shows that employee turnover t has a negative effect on firm survival. This result might reflect the potential loss of human capital. We suspect that the negative effect of employee turnover is caused by an (on average) higher outflow than inflow of new employees in older firms. This suspicion is supported by the literature on job creation (see, e.g, Davis et al. (1997) ). We investigate this issue in more detail in Model 6. Furthermore, we might expect employee turnover to improve performance in mature firms, as a continuing inflow of, for example, new knowledge and ideas are important factors in development and growth.
In Model 4, Table 2 , we introduce the variable "employee turnover ratio, age 0-2" to test Hypothesis 3a. We expect that higher initial employee turnover increases the longterm hazard of exit. Confirming this expectation, Model 4 shows that, when controlling for current employee turnover, higher initial turnover decreases survival time after the fifth year. An increase in the initial turnover ratio by one standard deviation, decreases the expected time to failure by 10.27 %.
The investigation of employee turnover in the above models does not allow us to differentiate between employee inflow and outflow. However, the negative effect on survival could be driven by the latter, as employees "leave the sinking ship" or leave because the firm downsizes before exiting (Almus, 2004) . For these reasons, Model 5 separates turnover into employee outflow and inflow. As we would expect, Model 5 shows that employee outflow t has a negative effect on firm survival and that employee inflow t has a positive effect, reflecting that growing firms are more likely to survive and vice versa.
Moreover, Model 5 finds that higher initial employee inflow has a negative effect on firm survival. In accordance with Hypothesis 3b, this result suggests that there is a limit to the relative number of new employees that a firm is able to integrate during its initial years without jeopardizing (long-term) performance through disorganization and loss of efficiency. Similarly, we hypothesize that higher average employee tenure after two years has a positive effect on long-term firm survival (Hypothesis 3c). In support of our hypothesis, we find that an increase in initial employee tenure by one standard deviation increases the expected time to failure by 9.09 %.
Finally, in strong support of Hypothesis 1, initial employment growth's negative effect on firm survival remains significant in most models. However, the effect is slightly reduced when controlling for initial employee tenure and turnover. Moreover, the effect is no longer significant when we introduce the initial inflow of new employees. These results indicate that these variables at least partially explain initial high growth's negative effects on firms'
long-term performance.
Firm growth
To control the results of the above analysis, we further estimate employment growth models (equation 4) using GEE regressions. Estimations are based on 74,788 yearly observations from 1998 to 2007 for 15,007 unique firms (Table 3 ). The models only include firms that are active after the fifth year.
Changing our measure of firm performance (from survival to employment growth), does not alter the previous conclusions. Thus, all models in Table 3 find that initial growth has a negative effect on firms' employment growth after the fifth year. This finding confirms Hypothesis 1, which suggests that a lack of organizational stability in terms of employee composition during the early years has persistent and negative effects on firms' long-term performance. Moreover, Table 3 shows that higher initial turnover and a higher initial inflow of new employees have negative effects on surviving firms' long-term employment growth, in support of Hypothesis 3a and Hypothesis 3b, respectively. Finally, we find that higher initial employee tenure increases employment growth after the fifth year, in support of Hypothesis 3c.
In Hypothesis 2a and Hypothesis 2b we proposed that initial high growth and employee turnover increase long-term employee turnover. This point is important, as excessively high employee turnover might have negative effects on firm performance. In support of this idea, Baron et al. (2001) demonstrate that employee turnover has a negative effect on firms' revenue growth. Moreover, we find that higher employee turnover t decreases expected survival time (Table 2) . Therefore, if these initial factors increase employee turnover after the fifth year, the trade-off between initial growth and firms' long-term performance might be further explained. We investigate this issue below. The models only include observations of firms if age ≥ 5. All regressions include unreported controls for GDP growth, Year (9 dummies), Industry (40 dummies), and Region (76 dummies). Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: † : 10% * : 5% * * : 1%
Employee turnover
In Table 4 , we estimate the employee turnover ratio (equation 9), using GEE regression.
Estimations are based on 74,788 firm-year observations from 1998 to 2007 for 15,007 unique firms. The models only include firms that are active after the fifth year.
We argue that high initial employment growth might lead to hasty and potentially mistaken hiring decisions, thus increasing long-term employee turnover. Moreover, employees who thrive in an innovative and vivid growth environment are likely to leave the previous gazelle company if (or when) growth rates decline and bureaucracy is initiated.
Thus, Hypothesis 2a suggests that higher initial employment growth eventually increases employee turnover. All of the models in Table 4 show that initial growth has a positive effect on employee turnover after the fifth year, which strongly supports this hypothesis. Model 1 finds that an increase in the initial employment growth rate by one percent leads to an increase in the turnover ratio of 1.42 percentage points. In all models, the effect decreases with time. An additional year decreases the effect by -0.30 percentage points per percentage increase in initial employment growth. This result suggests that the counterbalancing effect of time reverses the positive effect of initial growth on employee turnover after 9.7 years (after start-up). Therefore, the model only partially supports the hypothesis regarding the persistent effects of initial growth on employee turnover. In Models 2 to 4 in Table 4 , we investigate Hypothesis 2b, which suggests that higher initial employee turnover increases long-term turnover. In support of this hypothesis, when controlling for initial employment growth, we find that higher initial employee turnover ultimately increases employee turnover. Thus, Model 3 suggests that a one standarddeviation increase in initial turnover increases the turnover ratio at time t by 5.15 percentage points. Furthermore, we show that a higher initial inflow of new employees increases the long-term turnover ratio (Model 3), whereas, conversely, higher initial employee tenure ultimately leads to lower employee turnover (Model 4).
Discussion and additional tests
Although the above analyses strongly support our hypotheses, several aspects are subject to criticism. Therefore, we conduct various additional tests in order to address these queries and pursue alternative explanations for our findings.
First, in Figure 1 , we showed that new firms with low or moderate employment growth ultimately outperform high-growth start-ups. However, one might argue that this apparent trade-off between initial high growth and long-term performance is driven by differences in frailties among surviving firms, and not by the negative effects of initial organizational pressure is low, we should expect that the risk of firm failures over time will follow a pattern of liability of adolescence or aging (Le Mens et al., 2011) , as well as higher growth rates for new firms. Conversely, low initial growth rates might reflect a more competitive market, and, hence, higher selection pressure, suggesting that fewer but relatively more competitive start-ups survive until the fifth year. To address this concern, we first examine the five-year survival rates for firms from each of the three categories (1. thirdtile to 3. thirdtile). Table 1 shows the share of firms from each category that are included in our final sample, as they did not exit before the fifth year. In accordance with the above argument, we should expect the lowest survival rates for the first and the second thirdtile and the highest survival rates for the high-growth entrants. Consistent with this hypothesis, Table 1 shows that young firms within the first thirdtile exhibits the lowest five-year survival rate. However, firms with moderate and high growth (2. and 3. thirdtile, respectively) exhibit very similar survival rates, indicating that the two categories face an equal initial selection pressure. According to the above argument, this indication would imply that more relatively weaker firms from these two categories are included in our sample, leading to equally higher exit risks after the fifth year. However, contrary to this prediction, Figure 1 shows that firms with initial moderate growth have a significantly higher survival rate than high-growth start-ups. Moreover, this result is buttressed by the above survival analysis (Table 2) . We argue that this result implies that initial differences in the selection pressure facing firms in the three categories cannot explain the trade-off between initial high growth and long-term performance.
The above analysis implicitly assumed that higher initial growth affects survival time within the three categories equally. Model 2 and Model 3 in Table 5 investigate this assumption further through the inclusion of dummy variables for the three growth categories.
First, Model 2 confirms that higher initial employment growth decreases the expected time to failure when we control for the three growth categories. Moreover, Model 2 finds a longer expected survival time for firms in the second thirdtile than for firms in the first thirdtile, all else being equal, whereas high-growth firms (3. thirdtile) exhibit lower survival rates than firms in the first thirdtile. In Model 3, Table 5 , we include the interaction term between time (years after age 5) and the growth categories, allowing a potential time-effect of initial growth to vary among the three categories. The model repeats the trade-off between excessively high initial growth and long-term performance that we illustrated in Figure 1 . For the firms in the second thirdtile, the expected survival time is 1.19 times the expected survival time for firms in the first thirdtile, whereas the expected survival time is lower for firms in the third thirdtile than for the reference group, all else being equal. However, by definition, the three groups differ in their initial growth rates. When considering the average initial growth rates of each category (see Table 6 ), the aggregated effect of the second thirdtile is (only) an average increase in the expected survival time of 2.46 %. Correspondingly, the aggregated average effect on the expected survival time for the third thirdtile is -39.56 %. Second, we hypothesize that slower growing entrants might eventually outperform gazelle companies. In support of this possibility, we find strong evidence that initial higher growth has a persistent negative effect on expected survival time. However, employment growth implies a simultaneous increase in firm size, which, conversely, exhibits positive effects on survival. We must consider this counterbalancing effect of firm size when proposing an eventual aggregated lower performance for gazelles. Furthermore, one might hypothesize that the apparent trade-off between initial high growth and firms' longterm performance is driven by small and stable organizations (low employment growth and turnover). If their costs of remaining in business are small relative to larger organizations, these stable and low-growth firms might choose to continue activities for a longer period of time, despite potential low efficiency. This possibility suggests an alternative scenario in which small firms' relative low costs of continuing business activities are mistaken for a negative effect of initial higher employment growth. To test this alternative explanation and to consider the counter-balancing effect of firm size, we divide the firms into three size categories: 0 to 5, 6 to 20 and more than 20 full-time equivalents (see descriptive statistics
in Table 6 ). Then, we estimate Model 1 in Table 2 separately for each firm size t category.
First, we estimate the effect of initial higher growth for firms that employ 0 to 5 full-time equivalents when they enter the estimation sample at age 5 (see Model 1, Table 7 ). As
we expected, the model shows that initial higher growth has a negative effect on survival.
When investigating the alternative explanation that small firms with only minor costs of staying in business dominate our results, Models 2 and 3 exclude the smallest firms from the sample. Model 2 in Table 7 predicts the effect of initial growth on survival for firms with 6 to 20 employees. The model shows a greater negative effect for medium-sized firms than for the smallest firms, which results in the rejection of the alternative explanation.
Similarly, Model 3 investigates the effect of initial growth for firms with more than 20 employees. The model does not find initial higher growth to have an effect on survival for the largest firms. However, note that this category only includes 5 % of the population.
The lower number of observations and, in particular, firm failures, might explain the absent effect. Nevertheless, we can confirm that the negative effect of initial high growth on long-term performance is significant for the vast majority of firms in the population. In addition, Models 4 and 5 in Table 7 show that this result also holds if we instead categorize firms by start-up size. Finally, within the existing empirical framework, we cannot overlook the potential offsetting of the negative effect of initial high growth by increase in firm size. Thus, we cannot provide conclusive evidence that, on average, gazelles are eventually outperformed by slower growing entrants. However, based on this analysis, we can conclude that although more employees increase survival, attaining a larger firm size through continuous moderate growth is preferable to attain this size quickly through initial high growth rates.
Third, recall that our sample includes start-ups emerging between 1994 and 2001. This period coincides with the rise and fall of many high-tech and Internet-based companies.
Therefore, we might suspect that the above results are driven by such high-growth start- ups, which exited when the "dot-com era" ended. Testing this alternative explanation, we re-estimate all models, excluding firms from the IT sector. However, we do not find that this alteration changes the above conclusions. 8
Fourth, we implicitly suggest that initial high growth and employee turnover have negative effects on firms' long-term performance in all industries. However, different factors might have greater significance when explaining the negative effects on performance across industries. For example, the lack of investments in fixed capital might weigh highly, thus explaining the negative effects of initial high growth in traditional manufacturing, whereas the lack of efficient organizational routines might be the dominant explanation in the service industries. The Service industry is the dominant industry in Denmark, accounting for approximately two-thirds of the GDP. This industry distribution is also reflected in our sample (see Table 6 ). This distribution suggests that the above effects might be particularly pronounced in the Service industry (although industry fixed effects were controlled for in our analysis). Thus, it is not certain whether the above results present an accurate picture for all industries. Testing this possibility, we estimate the firm failure models (Table 2) The industry distribution in our sample suggests that the Service industry might dominate our results. In support of this possibility, we find that initial tenure and initial turnover do not affect survival in the Traditional manufacturing and High-Tech industries, whereas the effects on the Service industry echo the results in Table 2 . Similarly, initial higher inflow of new employees decreases the expected time to failure in the Service industry but is insignificant in the High-Tech industry. Conversely, initial employee inflow has a positive effect on survival time for firms within the Traditional manufacturing industry. Hypothesis 3 (a, b and c) is thus primarily supported in terms of the Service industry. Finally, we find evidence that initial higher growth has negative effects on firms' long-term performance within each of the three industries, which supports Hypothesis 1.
However, the separate analysis reveals that initial high growth has a greater negative effect on survival time for firms in the High-Tech industry.
Fifth, as previously outlined, our results are not restricted to the choice to define the initial phase as the first two years of an organization's existence. One might argue that measuring initial growth within the first three years (or more) provides a better indicator of initial organizational setup than our current definition. Testing our results' sensitivity to the length of the initial growth spell, we re-estimate Model 1 in Table 2 , including the following variables: ln (employment growth, 0-3), ln(employment growth, 0-4) and ln(employment growth, 0-5) (see Table 8 ). When expanding the initial growth period, performance gradually converges to the long-term state. Therefore, we expect that the negative effect of initial high growth on expected survival time diminishes as we approach the cut-off point (firm age ≥ 5 years). Therefore, Model 4 in Table 8 shows that the effect of initial high growth becomes insignificant when we extend the growth spell to include the fifth year after start-up. However, Table 8 confirms that the above conclusions are not sensitive to the length of the initial growth spell, as Models 3 and 4 show that initial high growth has negative effects on firms' long-term survival.
Conclusion and implications
Over the past two decades, there has been an increase in studies on high-growth companies sparked by these firms' disproportionate economic contributions, particularly in terms of job creation. Therefore, the current financial crisis has intensified the (already high) political interest in high-growth firms, especially gazelle companies. This paper contributes to the literature on high-growth firms by investigating a thus far underexplored aspect, the question of gazelles' long-term performance. We apply an organizational theory perspective to explain the correlation between firms' initial growth trajectory and their long-term performance. Within this context, we contribute to the understanding of how organizational blue-prints emerge and effect gazelles' long-term performance. Our analyses also emphasize the persistence with which initial factors make imprints in organizations, with long-term and, in many cases, even life-long effects on performance.
Our analyses reveal that although gazelle companies begin a flying start, they are not able to sustain this lead. Even worse, initial high growth has persistent negative effects on firms' long-term performance. First, we argue that this effect occurs because initial high growth hampers the organizational members' establishment of solid and efficient organizational routines. Second, we claim that a hasty expansion is likely to lead to errors in hiring decisions and thus to high turnover rates, resulting in frequent inflow and outflow as part of the organization's long-term employment scheme. Third, the necessity of adjusting the organizational form according to inevitable changes in the internal or external environment implies further turnover among the employees and marks a crucial disruption to the organization, which was presumably perfectly equipped to master the challenges of a high-growth environment. Basing our analyses on the Integrated Database for Labour Market Research (1994 to 2007), we confirm all hypotheses. Using survival analyses and generalized estimation equations panel regressions of employment growth, we demonstrate that high initial growth rates lead to a decrease in long-term performance in comparison with firms exhibiting initially moderate growth. Because higher initial growth implies larger firms, and firm size is known to increase survival, we cannot provide conclusive evidence that initially moderately growing firms eventually outperform gazelles.
However, the results are in favor of this notion. Nevertheless, the evidence are conclusive in terms of the idea that attaining a larger size through continuous moderate growth or, perhaps, a larger start-up size or higher growth at a later stage, after efficient routines are established, are preferable paths to attaining this size quickly through initial high growth rates. Moreover, we demonstrate that high initial growth implies persistent higher employee turnover. Under the assumption that high employee turnover is harmful to firm performance, this positive correlation between initial high growth and long-term employee turnover might contribute to the explanation of the trade-off between initial growth and firms' long-term performance.
The above results supported the argument that a lack of organizational stability in terms of employee composition during gazelles' early years facilitates the explanation of the trade-off between initial high growth and long-term performance. However, our analysis further revealed that the inevitable higher employee turnover in high-growth firms can only partially account for the negative long-term effects of initial high employment growth.
Therefore, future research should strive to continue uncovering the factors that drive the negative trade-off between initial high growth and long-term performance. For example, in immediate continuation of our theoretical framework, one might derive the hypothesis that high variation in employment growth has the greatest destabilizing effect in comparison with, for example, a longer period of high growth. Furthermore, the lines of arguments presented in this paper can potentially be extended to high-growth incumbent firms. In other words, we might expect high employment growth to have similar destabilizing effects in mature firms as well, with potentially serious implications for their future performance.
Finally, we hypothesize that initial high growth hampers the establishment of efficient organizational structures and routines. Recall that founder characteristics are argued to play a significant role in new firm performance. In particular, spin-off entrepreneurs are highlighted as a particular successful type of entrant. One argument for spin-offs' superior performance is their frequent adoption of the organizational form of the parent firm and the utilization of organizational routines familiar to them. Moreover, spin-offs recruitment of former colleagues from the parent firm might further ease the process of establishing an efficient organization, as they can build on existing relations, shared values, and routines. This possibility suggests that spin-offs might be more skilled at handling initial high growth. However, we leave these thoughts as suggestions for future research. Based on the above results, giving a second thought to the current political tendency to prioritize the enablement and fostering of prosperous conditions for the emergence and settlement of gazelles is worthwhile. Of course, the short-term effects of high-growth startups with regard to job creation are indisputable. However, we argue that to actively pursue such short-term economic gains of high-growth start-ups is to risk the consequences of initial high growth in terms of a higher tendency to eventually lose these jobs once again.
We claim that trimming political initiatives to specifically provide gazelles' requirement might come at the cost of forgoing more sustainable jobs and potentially hinder long-term expansion in terms of production efficiency. As we have argued, production efficiency requires routinized, stable and, most importantly, surviving organizations. From an economic perspective, it is thus dangerous to focus solely on short-term job creating machines with foreseeable long-term disadvantages.
